THE POLITICS OF RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT
NoRMAN WENGERT*

Many articles in this symposium deal with particular river basin problems and
their solutions and with substantive issues and programs. The present article, however, is concerned with certain characteristics both of the process by which problems
are identified and solutions chosen and of the environment within which these
identifications and choices are made. Its focus is not on decisions, but on decisionmaking and on the factors and forces influencing decision-making. This is the
political process.
Descriptions of public or governmental decision-making frequently indicate a
strong rationalist bias-an assumption that decisions are largely the end-product of
logical analysis and rational calculation, or at least that they should be. As will be
indicated later, this attitude is especially prevalent in the discussion of natural resources policies and programs. In this context, of course, the term politics has a
sinister connotation and symbolizes irrational, selfish decision-making. It is only
man's perverseness and corruption that stand in the way of better, more logical
techniques for determining public policy and force the use of political processes for
making public-governmental decisions. And these processes are regarded as undesirable and inferior ways for making second-best choices. This view is here
rejected.
I
PoLiTics DEFINED
As used in this article, the term politics denotes the total process by which

public-governmental decisions are made-decisions involving the selection of governmental means as well as ends, decisions determining the problems of government as
well as the techniques for dealing with them. This view of politics recognizes that
many factors and forces, concepts and circumstances, values and beliefs, ideas and
myths, influence the character and direction of public-governmental decisions. The
issues themselves, the manner in which they are drawn, the participants, their goals
and values, together with the structure, mechanisms and techniques, procedures and
practices of government-all are elements of the political process. All are comprehended in the term politics.
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In part, the process relies upon logical analysis and rational calculation; in part,
upon judgment, informed guess, and hunch; and in part, upon compromise, negotiation, bargaining, conflict, and struggle.
The end of the political process is the public interest. Yet, the determination of
that interest is no simple matter. Hence, a major task of the process itself is the
clarification and definition of the public interest. It may well be that at some future
time, mankind and governments will know enough to make social value choices
entirely by nonpolitical means. But borrowing Madison's figure of speech, the view
of this article is that till angels govern men, the political process, as here described,
will continue to be the way in which public-governmental decisions can best be made.
This is not a matter of irrationality, or corruption, or second-best choice, but of
designing a process which includes within its ken the diversities of democratic life
and which permits a constant examination and re-examination of values and goals,
methods and techniques. The political process is, thus, regarded as necessary for
refining and clarifying objectives, for permitting countervailing forces to organize and
operate, and for ultimately arriving at working- definitions of the public interest.
In this view, politics is a kind of market-place process in which trades and negotiations take place as individual, group, and community interests are weighed against
each other, costs and benefits assessed, and choices made. Like the market place of
the economists, the political market place is also concerned with allocations, not of
resources directly, but of power, authority, and influence over the affairs of government. It, too, presents a picture of imperfect competition, for inadequate knowledge,
power imbalances, and other impediments create frictions and distortions. And like
the process of the economic market, the political process often appears confused and
illogical, rather than neat and systematic. Like the concept of the economic market,
too, this concept of politics accepts the limitations of man's ability to foresee the future,
to consider all relevant factors, to account for all effects. It denies the present ability
of any man or group of men to define for others with finality either individual or
public interest, emphasizing the diversity in values and the difficulties in separating
out the tangled threads of self-interest from those of public interest. This is, of
course, the traditional view of the democratic, open society, based upon manifold
potential choice and free will. It implicitly challenges monolithic conceptions of
public policy which underlie most closed philosophic systems.2
From this pluralistic view of politics and the political process, moreover, several
summary propositions may be derived. The first is that points of decision are many,
scattered through the government structure and outside that structure but vitally
'The term "policy" is often used with a sense of static finality that divorces it from its relation to
"politics." Policy decisions, it is implied, lead to stability. Having once decided policy, those concerned
cclald then proceed to the next order of business and get some work done, so the argument goes. This
view of policy seems to assume superior knowledge in particular decision-makers or to require overriding of divergent interests and conflicting values, instead of emphasizing the continuous, ongoing character of the political struggle. For a discussion of policy which takes a divergent view from that here
suggested, positing a water policy that would be "a clear, accepted, reasonably stable body of principles,"
see Ackerman, Questions for Designers of Future Water Policy, 38 J. FAum EcoN. 971 (1956).
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related to it. As a result, politics and the political struggle are pervasive aspects of
government. The second is that groups are dominant participants in the process, a
group being simply a collection of individuals organized to act in concert for some
agreed-upon purpose. The third is that struggle, competition, bargaining, and
negotiation are characteristic of the ongoing process, reflecting the complexity of
individual and group goals and the continuous action and reaction, alignment and
realignment of factors and forces. 3 And finally, decisions occur in context, or, to use
Gaus's phrase, government takes place in an ecological setting.
The definition of politics and the political process outlined in these paragraphs
offers a conceptual framework for selecting and analyzing data on the politics of
river basin development. Space, however, does not permit a systematic and comprehensive application of these concepts to river basin development in this article. In
any case, a number of detailed studies of particular basins are available which deal
with some of these political forces,4 and other articles in this symposium touch on
particular aspects of river basin development politics. The balance of this article,
therefore, considers several selected and unique characteristics of the politics of river
basin development for topical treatment.
II
THE

IMPETUS To RivE

BASIN DEVELOPMENT

The political process in the United States operates in response to articulated demands and felt needs. Government does not act spontaneously nor for reasons of
whim, but rather because some individual or some group wants something and has
instigated action seeking decisions favorable to that position. In this part, some of
the interests and forces that give impetus to river basin development will be considered, and some of the groups involved will be examined.
For over fifty years, an articulate group of men-of-good-will has beer4 attracted to
the idea of the river basin as a logical and proper basis for resource development.
Their interests have been conservation, wise use of resources through positive, dynamic governmental action for what they considered to be the public good. Professor Samuel Hays suggests that for this group, the idea of rational management of
the nation's resources was an important goal. And undoubtedly this goal continues t9
'The

literature on the group basis of politics is extensive.

Among the more important works arc:

DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICs
(952); and BERTRAM M. GROSS, THE LEosSLA'nvE STRUGGLE (1953).

'The most written-about basin is the Tennessee, although few of the studies deal explicitly with
the political forces involved. For references, see TVA, AN INDEXED BIBLIOGRAP Y OF THE TENNESSEE
VALLEY AtrHoRITY (936)
(cumulative supplements issued annually). Also extensively treated is the
Missouri. E.g., RUsUS TEutAL, THE MISSOURI VALLEY (947); RICHARD G, BAuMHOFP, THE DAMMED
MISSOURI VALLEY (1951); MARIAN E. RiDGEWAY, THE MISSOURI BASIN'S PICK-SLOAN PLAN (1955).
Other basins have been less thoroughly reviewed, but note should be made of CHARLES MCKINLEY,
UNCLE SAM IN THE PACIFIC NoRTHW sr (952), and that classic study, ARTHUR MAASS, MUDDY WATERS:
'U-R ARMY ENGINEERS AND THE NATION'S RIVERS (195i). The periodical literature on basin development
is extensive, and the government publications overwhelming.
'SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1891-1920 (unpublished doctoral
dissertation in Harvard University Library 1952).
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draw support for river basin development from those who value systematic resource
management.
This viewpoint tends to assume that development is good (thus, really begging the
whole question) and focuses attention on the type of development and the organizational forms for carrying on that development. To this point of view are drawn
public-spirited citizens, conservationists, and others who seek the good of the community and find what appears to be a scientific reasonableness in river basin development. As suggested below, this position, which begins from logical enough premises,
is often converted into a complex structure of myths and symbols effective in rallying
public support and in providing a convenient rationale for individual values and
more specific interests of various kinds.
In many river basins, acute economic problems and the hope that they might
be dealt with more effectively has proved an important stimulus to programs labeled
basin development. For instance, the concern of Senator Kerr over the economic
well-being of his state and of the Southwest led to the five-year Arkansas-White-Red
River Basins SurveyY Similarly, in the northern Great Plains, the problems of drought
and flood, of agricultural surpluses, of population losses and industrial underdevelopment have given to proposals for Missouri basin development (especially as symbolized in the Pick-Sloan plan) an attraction that individual project proposals never
had. It matters not that the basin plan is only dressed in the language of areal unity
and regional development and that the practice remains largely the practice of
separate function and particularized responsibility. The important element is the
hope that somehow this program of development will result in solutions for some
of the problems now plaguing the region.
The increased interest in river basin development in New England7 reflects the
recent major floods in that area. But here, too, basic forces are the fact that the
economy is declining (relatively) and the hope of revitalizing it. Together, these
forces may finally be sufficient to overcome the strong antigovernmental biases of the
region and lead to expanded federal programs in the area.
And historically-and even to the present-economic improvement has been a
major factor in the formulation of the Tennessee Valley program; and in the
formative years of that program, it was obviously more significant than loyalty to the
particular agency, which today bolsters support of the regional program.
In addition to support for basin development which rests on such more-or-less
'Authorized by the Flood Control Act of 195o, §205, 69 STAr. 186, 33 U.S.C. §70in (1952). For
additional material on this subject see IRVING K. Fox

AND

ISABEL

PICKEaN,

THE UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM

FLooD CONTROL CONTROVERSY IN THE ARxANSaS-WTh-RED BASINS SURVEY (1957).

"New England, like the Arkansas-White-Red River region, is not a single river basin. Rigorous logic
would perhaps require a definition of the term "river basin." Yet, the fact is that the term is used
very loosely and, as is suggested infra, gains political significance from this very fact. In many cases,
river basin development is equivalent to river development as this may be defined by the particular
group, agency, or individual using the concept. At the same time, emphasis on the basin is usually meant
to connote a broader-gauge, more inclusive approach to river problems and is often considered equivalent
to a "regional" approach. But the literature on regionalism is not at all agreed on the definition of the
region and even less on whether a river basin is a sound and proper regional unit.
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vague yearnings for a solution to pressing economic problems, further impetus to
river basin development programs or segments of programs comes from numerous
special interests that will benefit or think they will benefit from particular development activities. Included in this group would be: contractors expecting construction
work, together with their host of suppliers; chambers of commerce and labor unions
anticipating bigger payrolls; shippers wanting water navigation or lower railroad
rates; sellerg of irrigation equipment; etc. And it should be noted that much of this
stimulus is utterly sincere, though perhaps misguided, based in part on the necessity
each of us feels to believe in the importance of what he is doing and in the desire
to do more of the same.
Key elements in the support picture are the government agencies with particular
programs to sell-flood control, irrigation, watershed protection, public power, etc.
Here, incidentally, one of the consequences of the functional approach to government organization is apparent, for the mandates of most agencies (the TVA is a
possible exception) are not to develop a region or a basin, but to prevent floods, save
the soil, irrigate the land, protect the forests, etc. The result is often mere use of river
basin development terminology because it is expedient and gains public support,
without really adjusting programs to regional development criteria!
Allied with the government agencies are numerous local groups and interests (including traditional political parties), the nature and motivation of their support of
river basin development presenting a broad range. The strong local support for flood
control in the communities affected by floods is well known, as is the fact that
much of this support stems from dubious economic policies and drives which permit
most of the costs of flood control to be passed on to the federal government, with the
local community seeming to get something almost for nothing.? Local support for
navigation works is often similarly based. In fact, of course, it is difficult to generalize, each basin, even each project, presenitig a different combination of factors,
and motivations being complex and variegated.
It seems obvious, too, that the many forces and factors which give impetus to
river basin development are not necessarily in harmony with one another. At the
same time, lack of consistency does not always result in conflict, for plural administration in a plural society encourages plural programs and policies. And the
language of river basin development may suggest a specious unity of purpose and
program.
In fact, mechanisms and institutions for clarifying conflicts and permitting choices
with respect to the goals of river basin development are weak and inadequate.
Where conflict over goals develops, pressures of various sorts push in the direction
1
of expedient accommodation of many interests and issues (e.g., the Pick-Sloan plan), O
8

TION

The administrative aspects of this problem are explored- in JAMES V. FESLER, AREA AND ADMINISMA-

(948).

' Numerous recommendations have been made in recent years urging that bcneficiaries should pay for

more of the benefits, but little progress in this direction has been made, and it seems doubtful that
changes in this respect will be forthcoming.
" For a discussion of this plan, see RMDGEwAY, op. cit. supra, note 4.
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rather than resolution of conflicts and clear decisions on goals and objectives. A
prime value is to avoid stalemate so that programs (as well as debate) can continue,
consistent with the attitude that everybody benefits from basin development.
It might be noted, moreover, that neither the causes of the problems nor the
proposed solutions need be based upon close analysis and logical reasoning. The
support for river basin development arises, rather, from the belief that such development offers a solution to problems, the reality of which cannot be denied, even if the
causes are not understood.
III
PARTICIPANTS

AND ISSUES

While participants in river basin development have been generally characterized
in the preceding section, it should be noted that participants are functions of the issues
and problems arising in particular basins. And within each basin, to a large-degree,
the combination of issues and participants is unique. This suggests the need for
a case-by-case examination, which is not feasible in this article. Some of the typical
issues can, however, be mentioned to suggest the nature of this aspect of the political
struggle.
Controversies over water allocation have been especially frequent in the semiarid
West. Disputes over the allocation of costs and benefits among upstream and downstream, rural and urban, local and national interests are common. With respect to
flood control, the debate over high, low, or no dams continues, complicated by considerations of the role of land-use management, diking, and flood walls. Disputes over
program priorities have also arisen but rarely in a form that has permitted clear-cut
decisions.
Overshadowing all other issues, however, has been the issue of hydroelectric
power. Unquestionably, if this question had not been associated with river basin
development, the political struggle over such development would have been much
different. The conflict over hydroelectric power has most often been thought of in
oversimplified terms of public versus private power. Actually, more complex questions are frequently involved, including:
I. the extent to which maximum power production should be an objective of
river basin development;
2. the pattern of financing and, in multipurpose projects, of cost allocations;
3. rate or charge policies, including questions of taxation, tax equivalents, and
rate of return on the public investment;
4. whether a federal agency should have a utility responsibility to provide power
within a given area, expanding production by thermal generation when necessary to meet growing load demands;
5. transmission and/or distribution policies, including the question of preference
customers; and
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6. an overriding question of regional economic development as a federal responsibility.
These issues are too complex to examine in this article, but it should be noted
that while it is relatively simple to catalogue them, it is next to impossible to characterize and classify the participants in the controversy. The temptation to oversimplify must be avoided.
The privately-owned electric utilities are usually identified as opposed to certain
aspects of public power policy. But while at one time their position was hostile to
all public development, they have, in many areas, qualified their stand and now seem
to object primairily to public transmission and distribution policies which cut into
monopoly markets. Their preferences are, thus, for partnership policies which stress
sale of governmentally-generated energy to existing (and usually adjacent) utility
systems. In general, these preferences are consistent with the power policy inclinations
of the Army Corps of Engineers, which has not been noted for a vigorous pro-public
power position. Thus, supporters of the corps program and supporters of private
power interests are often in alliance. 1
Beyond these simple participant relationships, however, alliances and alignments
become complex and confused, requiring detailed examination of economic, geographic, and ideologic interests to determine patterns of relationships. And often
the connection between the position on power development and river basin development is subtle and obscure.
IV
MYTHS AND SYMBOLS

In a democratic, open society, which generally demands a high degree of group
support for public-governmental action, the use of evocative symbols in order to
communicate with the general public is normal, if not necessary and inevitable. The
point at which communication becomes manipulation is not considered here. But
it seems axiomatic that in order to convey meaning to the mass of citizens and to
mobilize support for goals and ideals, connotative, symbolic language is indispensable.
It is noteworthy, too, that ideas and concepts which in origin may have precise,
scientific meaning often, in the process of political communication, take on elaborate
symbolic overtones and become part of a complex myth structure.
Besides being important to political communication, however, myths and symbols
may also provide convenient rationalizations for particular interests, values, and goals.
In either case, the articulation and use of myths and symbols may be deliberate and
"'MAss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 188 et seq., discusses corps policies and attitudes on the public
power questions. The reader interested in sampling the variegated interest structure is referred to
Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 84 th
Cong., ist Sess. (1955), dealing with the U.S. COMM'N ON ORcANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OF TnE GOVERNMENT, WAVTR REsotuscs AND POWER (1955)

(second Hoover Commission Report).

These

hearings, held over several months in various parts of the country, cover over 29oo pages of printed
testimony and evidence reflecting the complex of interests and positions.
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contrived, or unconscious, automatic aspects of human intercourse. Their use may
be evidence of a propaganda effort or reflect the sincere convictions of those involved. In any event, myths and symbols play an important role in the political
process and must be carefully analyzed and appraised. The following paragraphs
examine some of the myths and symbols that have become identified with river
basin politics.
Perhaps one of the most potent symbols of river basin politics (and of resource
politics generally) is the concept of development itself. By this term, whether applied
to particular resources, to water projects, or to an entire river basin, are evoked a
host of images and favorable responses, ranging from pictures of the desert blooming,
with yeomen farmers tilling it, to active waterway commerce and industrial expansion giving new life to the economy of the basin. Of course, Americans want to
develop their resources, their river basins. No one can effectively oppose development;1 to resist amounts almost to subversion. Yet, the very term development
begs the questions of how much, by whom, when, at whose expense, and for whose
benefit. It says nothing about what development means nor how it can be achieved.
It is, in short, a twentieth-century counterpart of the "boomer" attitudes of the last
century, which led to the disposal and settlement of the public domain, the harvesting
of the forests, and the promotion of resource utilization generally.
The wisdom of hindsight has led to serious question whether the policies of that
earlier period were entirely sound. And it should be noted that the policies followed
were not without criticism and objection. But critics and objectors were overwhelmed
by "boomer" enthusiasms which carried the day. Whether current stress on development may appear in hindsight to have been ill-conceived remains to be seen; but
the parallel is sufficiently clear to be disturbing."
A somewhat more subtle mythology has grown up with respect to water availability. In the subhumid and semiarid West, the absolute scarcity of water has always
given an urgency to water supply which, until recently, was foreign to the more
humid parts of the nation. But in the last decade, these areas have encountered
a variety of water problems, and a strong tendency has developed to approach these
humid-area water problems in western terms. Problems that have their roots in
inadequate municipal planning, engineering, or financing are publicized and discussed as analogous to the traditional problems of the West. Difficulties that have
been created by plenitude and low cost of water, such as profligate use, are dramatized
in terms of a desert economy. Thus, a myth develops that America has a single
water problem, that the water supply is running out. It is obvious that the political
impact of this myth of oversimplification may be, and is, of considerable importance.
Allied is the mythology that is developing with respect to water pollution. Here,
12 In the bitter fight over whether to establish a Missouri Valley Authority, the level of development
was not at issue, nor was it suggested that the MVA program might mean a lower level of development
expenditure. The controversy was over the control of development, not its scope.
" A significant study of the impact of "boomer" psychology on public policy is WA.LACE SrNEo ,

BEYoND T-HE HuNDaEuDT

MEsuosAN (1954).
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the symbol of the pristine, sparkling mountain brook is portrayed as the proper goal
of public policy, no matter what the engineering problems, no matter what the
14
cost, and often no matter what the facts as to causes and cures.
Particularly difficult to analyze is the myth that envelops many resource policy
questions and river basin questions in particular. This is the myth that decisions
in this area of policy are simply questions of science and engineering-that only
physical standards and criteria are relevant to sound decisions. The explanation of
this situation is not hard to find. From the beginning of the conservation movement, some fifty years ago, many of its active leaders were engineers and scientists.
And members of these professional groups continue to play important roles in the
formulation of resource policies. Their values are conditioned by their professional
backgrounds (which is natural), and they often share a Platonic dream of a rationalized world in which public decisions would be made by philosopher-kings, who, in
the field of resource policy, would undoubtedly be engineers and scientists.
The resultant belief that in these technical skills lies a solution to political conflict
is evident, for instance, in the current proposals for a Board of Review as the final
top-level authority in the field of water policy.' 5 To assume that economic choices
and social values can thus be disciplined or submerged is to mistake the real character of the forces that lie behind river basin politics. To follow such a course, moreover, may merely divert the struggle to another point of decision. And if this is
the objective, then the analyst must determine, among other things, whether the
result removes the decision farther from public scrutiny and control, whether it deters
the operation of the countervailing forces which are vital to the democratic processes
of decision.' 6
Uniquely important to the politics of river basin development are the myths and
symbols that have grown around the idea of the river basin as an appropriate unit
for development programs. For many years, certainly into the 192o's and still today,
a dominant interest in rivers was not the basin as such, but particular projects, individual activities, isolated functions. The issues of what action government should or
should not undertake with respect to particular rivers involved intense political
struggle. But these issues were initially seldom drawn in terms of the basin and
its development. This was water politics, not strictly basin development politics. 7
The two are, of course, closely related, for river basin development includes water
24 The attitudes on pollution are reflected in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committeeon Public Works on S. 89o and S. 928, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. (1955), and Hearings Before the
House Subcommittee on Public Works on S. 890 and H. R. 954o, 84th Cong. ist and 2d Sess. (1955 and

1956).
15

This has been the position articulated in NATIONAL WATER POLICY PANEL OP TIlE ENGINEERS JOINT
COUNCIL, PRINCIPLES OF A SOUND NATIONAL WATER. POLICY (ig5i).

"Those concerned with government organization and structure often overlook the importance of
relating points of decision to the desirability of full and free political struggle. Criteria for governmental
organization involve not only questions of social psychology in the relation of supervisors to supervised;
they also involve questions of providing for the effective play of political forces in the dccision-making
process.
" A history of comprehensive water development may be found in 3 PRESIDENT'S WATER RESouRCEs
POLICY CoMM'N, REPORT C. 9 (I950).
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development. The significant distinction lies in the broader scope of river basin development and the symbolic overtones of such a broader approach. A brief survey
of the evolution of ideas with respect to the river basin is suggestive of the way in
which myths and symbols grow.
At the turn of the century, a new interest in using the rivers of the nation for
navigation was evident. The burgeoning electric power industry was scrambling
for hydroelectric power sites, while in western states, clamor for irrigation resulted
in injecting the national government into this phase of water use. At the same time,
a new stimulus to flood control in the lower Mississippi and increasing urbanization
in other areas set the stage for a growing concern over flood losses and water supply.
Since these several interests frequently involved the same river, the reasonableness
-even necessity-of considering interrelationships in thel entire system seems
obvious. When engineering techniques advanced to the point where it was possible
to construct a large power dam, its relationship to navigation and flood control (and
irrigation in the West) was perceived. Hence, concern for multipurpose projects
was a logical progression. Similarly, the interrelationships among projects in a single
river system was a natural result of more intensive development of particular streams.
And intensive development of a particular stream directed attention to the uses
of the water, power, and other benefits. But while the imperatives of topography,
hydrology, and engineering led logically to a coordinated approach to water development, such an approach might still be considerably short of what is today included
8
in the concept of river basin development.'
In his autobiography, Gifford Pinchot tells how the concept of resource interrelationships and basin unity came to him and was developed and elaborated by his
co-worker, W. J. McGee. To the latter, he attributes the language which President
in his letter establishing the Inland Waterways
Theodore Roosevelt incorporated
1
Commission in i9o7, stating:
It is not possible to properly frame so large a plan as this for the control -of our rivers
without taking account of the orderly development of other natural resources. Therefore,
I ask that the Inland Waterways Commission shall consider the relations of the streams
to the use of all the great permanent natural resources and their conservation for the
making and maintenance of prosperous homes.
It is the progression from mere water development to the development of all
resources that distinguishes a river basin approach and that gives to it its great
symbolic appeal.20 Thus, the watershed is visualized as an organic whole, having
peculiar, often mystical unifying characteristics. The river basin region is, consequently, regarded as offering a logical basis for economic development, which is
"8Limitations of data, inadequate technology, or merely a narrow focus of responsibility should not
be equated with an unawareness of the physical relationships in an entire river.
" Inland Waterways Comm'n, Preliminary Report, S. Doc. No. 325, 6oth Cong. ist Sess. iv (igo8).
See GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEw GROUND 328 (x947).
" So compelling is this symbolism of the basin that Senator Kerr found it useful to secure a study
of the three rivers that affect his state, the Arkansas, White, and Red Rivers. Cf. note 6 supra.
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contrasted with the alleged inappropriateness of traditional political boundaries.
In much of the discussion, these naturalist overtones are related to ideas of the balance
of nature, of the necessity of acting in harmony with the demands of flowing water.
Thus, basin development comes to be linked to elemental life processes.
The chain of reasoning which gives an essential unity to the river basin, not
alone for water programs, but for total development, leads, in this argument, to the
necessity of planning unity. And the entire conceptual structure is bolstered by
heuristic and hortatory phrases like "comprehensive," ".multipurpose," "integrated,"
"unified," and "balanced." Economic and general development are associated with
river development, and the watershed is assumed to be a proper and effective unit
for government planning and action.
Certainly, no one can argue for disunified, uncomprehensive, uncoordinated, disintegrated development. But these are not the logical alternatives. Yet, stating them
pinpoints the tremendous impact of the symbols"' and emphasizes the difficulties of
penetrating to the real issues of costs, benefits, alternatives, and consequences. One
result of this may be that the political struggle occurs over the wrong questions; for,
myths and symbols, especially when they possess an aura of rationality and reasonableness, can be effective diversionary devices, used to increase and preserve power,
prestige, and advantage. By cutting off analysis and criticism-and it is recognized
that the precise line between valid criticism and destructive attacks on essential
values is not always easy to draw-myths and symbols can provide a convenient and
secure facade for individual, group, and community or regional benefits presented
in terms of a larger public good.
Other myths and symbols of importance to the politics of river basin development
are suggested by terms and phrases like "valley authority," "private enterprise,"
"partnership policy," and "the power in the river belongs to the people." Each of
these and many others require sophisticated analysis if the political struggle over
river basin development is to be understood. But it is only possible to mention them
here to indicate the complexity of the myth and symbol structure.
V
THE PoLrIcs OF SPACE
The river basin is, by definition, a unit of space. And, as suggested above, the
idea of river basin development has had a strong popular appeal because of its implications of areal unity and integrity, especially when contrasted with an alleged
atomistic approach based on single purposes or single projects. From such an
idealized portrayal of river basin unity, it has often been assumed that areal integrity eliminated politics, unity being equated with harmony. This assumption
-' The hostility of so-called "regional scientists" to the river basin as a proper unit for regional development and specifically to the Tennessee watershed is reflected in that still important study, NATONAL
REsouPcEs CoMMiTEE, REGIONAL FACTORS IN"NAT5ONAL PLANNING 146 (1935). Yet, the validity of these
criticisms of the basin approach has been largely forgotten in the ensuing years, because, in my opinion,
of the symbolic appeal of the basin approach.
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rested upon a belief that a river basin development program necessarily was the
equivalent (if not the acme) of a rational, calculated plan of action, and as such,
conflict or controversy, choices or value differences were irrelevant and improper.
In fact, however, spatial aspects of river basin development have involved intense
political struggles. The issues of boundaries, the conflict among upstream and downstream interests, the reconciliation of urban and rural hostilities, and the difficulties
that have arisen because of the absence of a forum for political discussion and decision
are illustrations of some of these spatial factors.
River basin boundary politics have involved relations with contiguous areas as
well as conflicts within the basin itself. They have raised questions of intergovernmental relations and states' rights and have encouraged struggles among competing
bureaucracies for power, prestige, and especially for appropriations. Only a few of
these can be referred to here as typical.
First, is the question of what river system is to provide the boundaries for the
basin. This is the problem of drawing regional lines. No one has seriously proposed using the Mississippi watershed as the unit for basin development. Yet, this
rejection implicitly raises the question of why the Missouri should be and the
Ohio should not be the basis for development programs.22
So long as development is limited to navigation and local flood works (the
traditional programs of the Army Corps of Engineers), no serious conflicts over
basin boundaries arise. But add hydroelectric power, flood-storage reservoirs, irrigation, and broader development programs, and the struggle for inclusion or exclusion becomes intense. And once boundaries for development have been chosen,
the basin does take on a degree of unity with respect to other sections of the country.
The very process of choosing is aided because basin boundaries are set by nature and,
thus, carry an aura of determinist superiority over boundaries set by administrative or
political fiat. This the TVA learned as it retreated to its natural boundaries with
respect to all of its activities except power distribution and fertilizer research and
23
development.
The controversy between upstream and downstream interests has taken several
forms. In the Missouri basin, where substantial environmental, cultural, economic,
and other differences serve to set upstream off from downstream areas, disputes over
whether scarce water should be used for upstream irrigation or downstream navigation have been bitter. Participants took sides as between the Bureau of Reclamation
and the Army Corps of Engineers in this dispute.24
22 And, one might ask, why three basins should be considered appropriate for development: the
Arkansas, White and Red River basins. See note 6, supra.
"'The TVA Act had wisely provided that TVA programs might include contiguous areas, but pressures of various sorts confined most of the TVA programs to the watershed, whether or not this was
logical from the viewpoint of the program. Among the important pressures in this situation were competing federal agencies. In this connection, see NORMAN WENGERT, VALLEY OF ToMORROW: Tm TVA
AND AGRICULTURE c. 8 (952).
2" The conflicts were not resolved, although their intensity was reduced by the Pick-Sloan plan, which
critics generally deride as no solution, and by additional hydrological data which seemed to indicate that
water supply might be adequate for both upstream and downstream requirements.
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A variant of this controversy has been that between urban and rural interests over
flooding of agricultural land by reservoir construction to protect downstream cities
from floods or provide them with power. Except where storage reservoirs are built
in uninhabited, isolated regions, this conflict seems universal. It reached particular
vehemence in Kansas, where reservoirs to protect Kansas City would have flooded
high-value farm lands. 8
In the case of power and consumptive uses of water, the struggle over who shall
get the power or water has frequently been intense, but the solution to these conflicts
has often been less than creative. Water allocation agreements (compacts) among
riparian states are common, but their underlying philosophy is sterile, emphasizing
legalistic rights to given quantities of water, rather than determinations of public interest in water use and optimum development. Following the pattern with respect to
water, states have also sought to control hydroelectric power produced in or generated
by water falling within their boundaries. Thus, for example, North and South Dakota
resist sale of Missouri River energy in Minneapolis; and North Carolina has expressed
some dissatisfaction over the distribution of TVA power in downstream states. Fears
of Idaho that Columbia River power, generated in Idaho headwaters, will benefit the
sea coast metropolitan complex is said to be one of the factors in the Hells Canyon
controversy

6

This general issue of who benefits from river basin development has recently taken
on a new slant in connection with the recently authorized small watershed program
of the Soil Conservation Service.' Here, major disputants are two bureaucratic
power groups-the United States Department of Agriculture on the one hand, and
the Army Corps of Engineers on the other. Partly involved are technical questions
regarding the significance of land management for flood control. But the steady accumulation of hydrologic data over the past twenty years has resulted in a retreat
on the part of the agriculturists from the extreme positions that once were asserted,
when floods were largely blamed on bad land use s But while most bureaucrats have
adjusted their positions to newer and more reliable data, enthusiasts and partisans
continue to make exaggerated claims that if we just manage our soils properly, floods
will be eliminated and at a fraction of the cost of dams and levees 2
In many cases, the crux of the small watershed controversy is the fact that upstream land management with small control structures (as encouraged by the SCS)
may have a sufficient impact upon smaller, more frequent floods, while, at the same
time, leaving downstream urban centers victims of the larger, less frequent floods.
" This was the Tuttle Creek Dam.
" See Bessey, Political Issues of the Hells Canyon Controversy, 9 WEST. POL. Q. 676 (1956).
27
Watershed Protection and Food Prevention Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 666, x6 U.S.C. §§100-07 (Supp.
II, 1955).
2
The shift in views on this is clearly reflected in MIsSOURI BASIN SURVEY COMN'N, MIssoRu: LAND
AND WATER 124 et seq. (1953). See also the definitive study by LUNA B. LEOPOLD AND THOMAS MADDOCK, JR., THE FLOOD CONTROL CONTROVERSY (1954).
2For this point of view, see Farb, A Flood Prevention Plan, 65 NAT'L MuNic. REV. 214 (1956);

see also Peterson, Big-Dam Foolishness, Reader's Digest, July 1952, p. 63.
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In consequence, the economic basis for any flood works in the towns and cities, as
presently calculated by cost-benefit formulas, may be destroyed.30
Of a different character have been the political space problems raised by the lack
of coincidence among economic, administrative, and political boundaries with those
of the watershed or river basin. The ardent advocate of basin development urges that
economic and political boundaries are irrelevant. But, as has been suggested, this
assumes that the watershed boundaries are reasonable and sound for general development, contrary to the facts in many cases. 3 ' The resulting tensions and problems
are complex.
One aspect of the boundary question that has not received sufficient attention is
the absence within the river basin unit or region of effective devices and institutions
for raising and settling value, goal, and other policy issues. In short, the political
process is stunted with respect to the river basin because there is no effective political
forum for discussion and resolution of basin problems. This political-institutional
deficiency can have serious consequences.
At the national level, Congress can, at best, devote only casual attention to policy
questions affecting particular basins, unless, perhaps, there is a prospect of patronage
dividends. And then, decisions are likely. to be on the basis of bargains and trades.
Most federal agencies, similarly, find it difficult to deal with basin problems in a
basin perspective. To be sure, these agencies talk about river basin development, but
too often this is convenient cover for an essentially functional approach. The mere
fact that agencies operate in a particular basin does not give to their programs a basin
orientation. The crucial distinction is, on the one hand between carrying programs
to this or that region, and on the other of developing a regional program on the
basis of basin needs and problems, with program content being determined by these
needs and problems.
The result is that no matter how suitable a river basin may be as a spatial unit
for the solution of water and other resource problems, the absence of political and
administrative organizations and institutions competent and responsible for basin
decisions hampers this approach. It intensifies the use of myths and symbols of
basin development for protection of decisions that have not been examined in terms
of regional interest and permits development decisions to be made by default-for the
public cannot know what is going on in the absence of effective political struggle.
In this context, the valley authority device needs to be re-examined to determine
the extent to which it may provide a more effective instrument for raising and
resolving issues for political decision. It makes only tactical difference whether
the regional agency is called an authority, after the TVA model, or a commission,
as proposed by the Missouri Basin Survey Commission. The important test is the
scope of the agency's responsibilities and its authority to deal with basin problems.
An adequate regional agency would at least provide an administrative forum
"oThis is well illustrated in the comparative study of alternative plans for the Salt-Wahoo basin made
by the MissouRi BAsIN SURVEY COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 28, at X32 et seq.
" See note 21 supra.
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for dealing with basin problems in a basin perspective. It would leave unresolved the
need for an institution around which processes of representation, election, debate,
and discussion might center and through which responsive and responsible decisions
might be made. From the administrative point of view, it is easy to overlook the
importance of those aspects of the political process which permit the political struggle

to go on and which offer a correlation between responsibility, responsiveness, and
control. It is essential to provide a playing field, as it were, in which contending and
countervailing forces maneuver and mobilize more-or-less in the open and under
public scrutiny. This is the unique role of the legislative process, and it is the
absence of legislative phases of the political process which sets limits to the basin
approach. For in the absence of new political boundaries, no administrative agency
can alone provide an adequate mechanism for the policy choices which are involved.
VI
PLANNING POLIICS

That river basin development requires planning of some kind is implicit in the
concept as such and has been taken for granted for many years. By planning is
meant merely a more-or-less systematic means for identifying problems, marshalling
facts, and preparing solutions so that decisions may be more deliberate and consequent. Thus defined, planning may occur at many points within the governmental
structure, and its frame of reference may be very broad. It can, of course, be good
or bad, effective or ineffective. Moreover, since, by definition, planning deals with
the future, and since, by implication, it is often an early and major step in organizing
or reorganizing power and power relationships in the context of particular objectives,
an active political struggle frequently arises over who shall plan and to what ends.8 2
These questions, rather than abstract issues of whether there shall be planning, are
vital to river basin development. And the struggle to control planning and to determine the goals of planning is but a phase of the larger process of politics.
The idea that planning is somehow above politics because planners are assumed
to be experts providing scientific answers which purport to avoid the irrationalities of
pressures and interests and to resolve conflicts and struggles of politics is here rejected?3 But it should be noted that this rejected position has been strongly held
in conservation circles, where an abounding faith in supposed scientific and engineering certitude (as already discussed) has served to obscure political, economic,
and social value choices. To be sure, in so far as systematic attack on problems may
provide knowledge in lieu of ignorance, to that extent, planning may mitigate
conflicts arising from misinformation. Planning based on logical analysis and rational
calculation may also contribute to clarification of goals and an understanding of
consequences. But it cannot select goals nor determine value preferences.
With respect to river basin development, a considerable amount of conflict among
2 Cf. RoBERT A. DAHL AND CHA .Es E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND ,VEL1'ARTE
especially
pt. x (1953)"For a more extended discussion of this view of planning, see WEiNroET, op. ci. supra note I, c. z.
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competing bureaucracies can be explained in terms of the struggle over who shall
plan, rather than mere competition for power and advantage. The strength of the
Army Corps of Engineers lies, in part, in its lack of enthusiasm for public power and
its inclination to subordinate other basin programs to navigation and flood control.
These biases of the Corps assure that its programs will involve a minimum disturbance to the status quo, for by their very nature, flood control and navigation are
not likely to stir up much organized opposition at the points where the crucial decisions will be made.
In this connection, it is significant to note that pressure seems to be developing
for turning the entire job of basin planning and development over to the Corps, especially in eastern basins, and a concomitant reluctance to use an interagency approach is
evident. While at one time this might have meant that economic development,
land-use, recreational potential, and other factors would have been ignored, it now
seems to mean merely that the Corps will employ its own specialists in these fields
and will fit their findings and recommendations into final plans in accordance with
values and goals held by the Corps 4
The same type of issues, as well as others, are involved in the struggle to create
a new agency to handle basin problems. One of the strengths of existing agencies,
which contributes to the preference for the interagency committee approach to basin
planning, lies in the fact that their objectives are known. In contrast, the planning
goals of any new agency responsible for a river basin would be unknown. This uncertainty effectively stymies experimentation with new institutional devices and
forces reliance upon coordinating committees, interstate compacts, and similar traditional techniques, experience with which has often been less than satisfactory. 5
A special aspect of planning politics illustrates some of these generalizations; this
is the cost-benefit situation. In recent years, Congress has usually required that
benefits must equal or exceed the costs of river development works. This has caused
intensive effort among water agencies to make cost-benefit studies and to refine
techniques for these calculations. Yet, all who are involved in cost-benefit work
readily admit numerous technical and conceptual difficulties which limit the accuracy
and precision of these studies. But, as a result of the inclination of Congress to
attribute a pseudocertitude to cost-benefit determinations, and because of the uncertainties in the calculations, it is not surprising that an intense struggle frequently
arises over who shall do the cost-benefit calculating. The importance of controlling
this phase of the planning process was indicated, for instance, in the report of the
Missouri Basin Survey Commission, which reported :36
While the Corps claims $51,795,0oo annually as a benefit from erosion control on agriThe total benefits are
cultural land, this study estimated these benefits at $964,ooo ....
estimated at $11,o96,ooo compared to $26,576,ooo estimated by the Corps. This makes a
"See MtAss, loc. cit. supra note xI.
" See the critical analysis of these devices in Missouri BASIN
especially pt. 8; see also WENGERT, op. cit. supra note I, c. 4.
"' Missouiu BASIN SURVEY COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 28, at
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change in the benefit-cost ratio from 1.9 to i as calculated by the Corps to o.8 to r based
on the Commission's study.
A problem in the area of planning politics which may become particularly significant in the near future is that of relating river basin development expenditures
to the needs of the national economy generally and the regional economies more
particularly. As yet, neither techniques nor institutions are adequate for dealing
with this problem, and the political struggle has not been very active. Recognizing
the important role that total public investment; plays in the economic growth of the
nation, the problem here would seem to be to fashion a mechanism by which the
public share of total investment can be determined within limits and then allocated
among the range of investment opportunities (e.g., schools, highways, hospitals,
parks, flood works, etc.) and among regions.
Proponents of water development sometimes argue that water development is
entitled to a more-or-less fixed share of public funds or to a fixed share of the gross
national product. But this approach misses the important point of the shifting
character of public needs and consequent public investment. It assumes the composition of the public investment portfolio and begs the question that is of paramount
importance for public fiscal policy, namely, how much water development is desirable
37
in the context of other economic goals.
Other political struggles that arise in the context of who shall plan and to what
ends might be referred to, but perhaps this brief review suggests the types of forces
and factors involved in this category of river basin development politics.
VII
CONCLUSION

Since its beginnings over fifty years ago, the conservation movement has portrayed
basic policy issues as important, but essentially simple, choices between good and
evil, between the public interest and greed and personal gain. This conspiratorial
approach has characterized much of the discussion of river basin politics too. As
Richard Hofstadter has suggested, this was the mood of the Progressive Era, in which
the political struggle over resource policies and programs first became self-conscious?
And it continues to color much of the discussion of resource questions today.
To some, the pluralist approach developed in this article may verge on a kind
of nihilism. Certainly, it lacks the assurance and security of pat answers and simple
formulas. But it has the strength of realism, and it provides a structure within which
the political struggle takes a legitimate place, rather than one for which apologies are
necessary. In recognizing the diversity of values, it would seem also to avoid moral
absolutism and intellectual dogmatism, providing rather for a free trade of ideas in
the pattern of democratic traditions and tenets.
" The pressures that drive all public works programs to seek a fixed floor under their appropriations
are great. The desire to secure dedicated funds illustrates this; and in this connection, the fiscal impact
of the new billion-dollar federal highway aid program needs deeper analysis than it has yet received.
cHARD HOFsrADTER, THE AcE op RFFoRm (1955).

POLMCS

275

In this context, then, this article will have served its purposes if it will have
contributed to a broader understanding of the complex factors involved in river basin
politics, if it will, to a degree, have dispelled common misconceptions as to the nature
and role of the political struggle, and if it will have suggested a framework for
further analysis of that struggle in the total political process.

